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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

STANLEY J. CATERBONE
ADVANCED MEDIA GROUP
APPELLANTS

v.

LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON, et al.
APPELLEE
CASE NO. 07-4474
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 05-cv-2288)


BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF APPEAL
PER ORDER DATED MAY 27, 2008


AND NOW, on this 1st day of July 2008, Stanley J. Caterbone and Advanced Media Group, APPELLANTS, do hereby file this Brief in Support of Appeal in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals as ORDERED in the BRIEFING AND SCHEDULING OREDER of May 27, 2008. APPELLANTS respectfully avers as follows: APPELLANT, Stanley J. Caterbone, resides at 1250 Fremont Street, Lancaster, PA, 17603, is a United States Citizen and Advanced Media Group is a fictitious name registered in Pennsylvania with it’s principal place of business in Pennsylvania.

Date: July 1, 2008 Stanley J. Caterbone, Pro Se
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
amgroup01@msn.com
http://www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com/


TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page 3
2. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT Page 3
2.(a) STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES Page 3
2.(b) STATEMENT OF REVIEW Page 3
3. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW Page 4
4. STATEMENT OF THE CASE Page 4
5. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS Page 6
6. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS Page 15
7. ARGUMENTS Page 16
8. CONCLUSION Page 19
9. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Page 21
10. APPENDIX Page 22

1. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

1. Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States
2. Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. Al., U.S. District Case No. 05-2288
3. Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir.1982)
4. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)
5. Zucker v. Westinghouse, 374 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2004)

2. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal was filed under FRAP 4. (a) (1) (A) and is of a final order that disposes all parties of all claims. The notice of appeal was filed on November 19, 2008 and was recorded on November 23, 2008, one day after the 30th day. November 22, 2008, being a legal holiday, Thanksgiving, was not the last day to record the appeal as a timely appeal according to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. This issue is cured in the Response to the Letter of Jurisdiction filed by CATERBONE and is a timely appeal. The district court had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.A. § 43, Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 through 18 U.S.C. § 1968, and 15 U.S.C. Anti-Trust Act.

The "Federal Civil Rights Statute" (Rev Stat § 1979, 8 U.S.C.A. § 43, 2 FCA title 8, § 43) provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

2. (a) STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
On May 23, 2005 (one week after this case, 05-2288) CATERBONE filed a Petition for Chapter 11 Reorganization Case No. 05-23059 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court. This case 06-cv-3955 in the Third Circuit on August 25, 2006. The following district court cases: 06-cv-4650; and 06-cv-5138 (Habeas Corpus); and 06-cv-4734. 06-cv-4734 was the beginning of a federal false claims act filed under duress filed on October 20, 2006. The case contained no complaint, was never served on anyone, nor was never amended. CATERBONE was falsely imprisoned weeks after both 06-cv-4650 and 06-cv-4734 were filed. Habeas Corpus 06-cv-5138 was filed on November 11, 2006 by CATERBONE appearing pro se while falsely imprisoned in the Lancaster County Prison on October 30, 2006 until December 29, 2006. Three cases were received by the U.S. District Court on June 10, 2008 and are awaiting forms to be docketed: CATERBONE v. County of Lancaster, et. al.,; CATERBONE v. Lancaster City Bureau of Police, et. al.,; CATERBONE v. PENNDOT, et. al.,

2.(b) STATEMENT OF REVIEW
The district court had abused it’s discretion and erred in the DISMISSAL of this case with prejudice. The merits analysis was not applied and the district court completely ignored all motions that contained factual information as to why CATERBONE could not comply with the time specified ORDER to amend the complaint, which was the reason CATERBONE had continued to file motions for extension of time. At the same time CATERBONE had made every attempt to notify and complain to law enforcement and oversight authorities in order to stop the activities, which made it impossible to amend the complaint by the district courts specified time period. The motions included several incidents of abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating), violations of the Federal Torts Claim Act regarding obstruction of due process and obstruction of justice that contributed to CATERBONE not being able to file an amended complaint in the time specified by the district court.

3. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Did the District Court Abuse It’s Discretion in it’s DISMISSAL on October 22, 2007 by not taking into consideration: that the APPELLANT (CATERBONE) was appearing pro se with liberal construction; all of the abuses and civil rights violations that the APPELLANT has brought to the District Courts attention in previous motions and pleadings; and that CATERBONE did not have a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct?timely and complete Amended Complaint? (Click Here)
2. Did the District Court err in dismissing the case without addressing the factors set forth in the merits analysis in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)?

4. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a complex civil rights and anti-trust case containing elements of a civil conspiracy and RICO violations culminating from a Federal False Claims Act complaint from 1987. Due to the mass array of violations, CATERBONE was only able to alert local, state, and federal authorities of the abuse and fraud within International Signal & Control (ISC) back in 1987, but never was afforded due process to file the actual Federal False Claims Act complaint and the other civil complaints that are contained in this case. ISC and it’s employees, including founder and CEO James Guerin were indicted in 1991 for a host of crimes including a $Billion Dollar fraud and export violations including selling cluster bombs to South Africa, which ultimately were sold to Iraq and used during the Persian Gulf War. Guerin and others plead guilty in 1992 and were sentenced accordingly. Guerin spent 14 years in a federal prison for his crimes, as did others.

This case contains abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating), violations of the Federal Torts Claim Act, and other violations such as false arrests, false imprisonment, and a fabricated mental health record that has occurred from 1987 until today that have made the cover-up of these violations and crimes possible. The defendants and other interested parties and persons used these malicious civil violations and civil torts to discredit all and any allegations of misconduct and wrongdoing and to slander and libel CATERBONE and his companies to the general public-at-large. CATERBONE’S companies, namely Advanced Media Group, also fell victim as the perpetrators attempted to rewrite history and the record. In addition this case contains fraud, extortion, loss of time, loss of opportunity, and loss of income that have made the journey of justice and remedy for these actions almost impossible to litigate.

There is also a criminal element and public corruption element that has followed CATERBONE and this case, however the abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating), and the violations of the Federal Torts Claim Act coupled with the misconduct of public officials has kept the perpetrators and defendants safe, for the time being. Judicial misconduct and abuse of discretion runs rampant in all of CATERBONE’S cases. The abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating), and violations of the Federal Torts Claim Act continues to provide motive and security to those that harm, damage, and injure CATERBONE. There is a vast array of mail fraud and misconduct in the offices of the clerks of the respective courts that have helped to confuse the record and interrupt this litigation. Court filings, notices, and ORDERS are constantly kept from reaching CATERBONE causing a record of missed hearings and late filings. Computer intrusion and hacking is used to confuse and manipulate the filings that are submitted. CATERBONE has been challenged with the task of verifying or confirming the authenticity of research materials and court related materials in the course of this litigation. This case involves civil torts and abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating) that address these issues. Violations of the Federal Torts Claim Act will be addressed in future litigation or will be included in the Amended Complaint.

The theft of intellectual property and invasion of privacy is constant to keep CATERBONE from performing and executing his litigation strategy in full optimal performance, without the security necessary to protect and preserve the record of these crimes and violations. CATERBONE’s expertise in computer technology and information technology is often challenged when preserving the record. This case also addresses those issues.

On May 16, 2008 CATERBONE filed the complaints in this case under duress, and merely submitted to the courts a document that contained finding of facts in chronological order. The Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin found numerous meritorious claims in her ORDER and MEMORANDUM of June 13, 2006 contained in the complaint and used a merits analysis. CATERBONE was then instructed to file an amended complaint, which he requested to the district court in filings soon after the original complaint was filed. The DEFENDANTS have filed numerous motions for dismissal throughout this case. Most of the causes of actions were time barred and exceeded the statute of limitations. CATERBONE was never able to file an amended complaint until September 15, 2007 and addressed the issues of the statute of limitations in order to cure that deficiency in this case, although admitting that the amended complaint did not completely contain all of the causes of actions and complaints in this case. The obstruction of due process and other violations and actions have precluded CATERBONE from submitting an amended complaint according to the rules of procedure, which contained all of the causes of actions, in the time specified period mandated by the district court.

There needs to be special consideration and discussion of the special status rules and doctrines of pro se litigants and how it applies to CATERBONE and this case. As a general rule, every federal court in the United States affords “pro se” civil litigants special status , although courts often differ on the way they describe that status. This general rule is followed, to varying degrees, by state courts.
 
There is a covert objective by the County of Lancaster, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and other principals, stakeholders, and defendants of this complaint to manipulate CATERBONE into the revocation of his special status rights as a pro se litigant in Federal Courts through the abuse standard of the doctrine by forcing CATERBONE to litigate for every constitutional right, the right of protection by law enforcement, the payment for services, and other considerations that CATERBONE is entitled to receive. Loosing special status would result in the dismissal of all of CATERBONE’s federal complaints. This would also allow no oversight and justice to the multitude of abuses of discretion and errors that have occurred at the state court level, and provide no due access for all of the meritorious claims that have been illegally dismissed in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas, and the Pennsylvania Appellate courts. It is the perfect strategy, and the only strategy that is available to since keeping highly qualified attorneys from representing CATERBONE failed when CATERBONE filed pro se in 2005 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas. For 18 years the strategy of keeping attorneys from representing CATERBONE has been successful in keeping these complaints from the courts. However, when CATERBONE appeared pro se, that strategy was mooted.
 
In reviewing at the abusiveness rationale used for the revocation of the special status afforded to pro se litigants the courts have deemed that any pro se litigant with 12 or more complaints in any given year warrant sanction and the revocation of the special status. The first and most important loss to CATERBONE would be loosing the liberal construction of complaints, pleadings, and briefs when litigating in the federal courts. There are other benefits of the special status that would be lost : (1) a right to have one’s complaint treated as amended by one’s papers in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim; (2) a right to file an amended complaint, including a second amended complaint; (3) a right to be specifically notified of the consequences of failing to respond to a summary judgment motion before being subjected to those consequences; (4) a right to be excused from complying with service deadlines, discovery deadlines, motion-filing deadlines, and page limits; and (5) a right to be presumed to have been acting in good faith when sanctions are being contemplated. The rationale for conferring this special status is that pro se litigants need help since they are often inexperienced or unfamiliar with legal procedures or terminology.
 
The special status needs to be preserved for CATERBONE, who has never used a ghostwriter or any other person in the formulation, preparation, writing, or filing of any court documents.
 
This court should use the rule of law and administer justice to right this 21-year odyssey of wrongs, damages, financial losses, pain and suffering, loss of opportunities, and loss of family and society that has been subjected to CATERBONE and move this case forward with all of the authority and discretion bestowed upon it.

5. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about May 16, 2005, Plaintiff-Appellant, Stanley J. Caterbone ("CATERBONE") filed a pro se Complaint against Fulton Bank ("Fulton"); Mellon (Commonwealth) Bank; Southern Regional Police Department; Avalon Police Department; Stone Harbor Police Department; and the Lancaster County Sheriff’s Department in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On the same day CATERBONE filed a Motion to Seal the Complaint for 2 reasons; National Security Concerns and the attempt on CATERBONE’S life that happened in July of 1991; after the ABC News Nightline broadcast of International Signal & Control (ISC) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) selling cluster bombs and other weaponry to South Africa through to Iraq .

On or about December 17, 2005, CATERBONE sent a letter to the district court requesting leave to Amend the Complaint and a hearing. No Defendants have been served to this point.

By ORDER dated January 5, 2006, the district court directed CATERBONE to serve Defendants with the Summons and Complaint by January 25, 2006 or face dismissal of the Complaint without prejudice.

Fulton Bank filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and a brief in support of the Motion to Dismiss on February 9, 2006. Motions to Dismiss were also filed on behalf of Manheim Township Police Department, Commonwealth National Bank (i.e. Mellon Bank) and the Lancaster County Prison.

On or about June 2, 2006, while the Motions to Dismiss were still pending, CATERBONE filed a MOTION requesting an ex parte meeting with the Honorable Mary A McLaughlin "to discuss the problems of preceding this action without obstruction of justice, retaliation, and intimidation; and to amend the original complaint as discussed previously."

Fulton Bank filed a Response in opposition to the Motion for an Ex Parte Meeting on June 5, 2006. CATERBONE hand-delivered a Reply to counsel for Fulton on June 12, 2006. On the same day, the district court issued an ORDER granting the Motions to Dismiss. The district court's order dismissed the Complaint as to all Defendants on the basis of improper service and the expiration of the statute of limitations. The court's order also denied the Motion for an Ex Parte Meeting with the Court as moot.

On June 13, 2006 the Honorable Judge Mary McLaughlin signed a MEMORANDUM and ORDER. The MEMORANDUM used the merits analysis and found more than 15 meritorious claims against the DEFENDANTS, and ORDERED the motions to dismiss the complaints against Mellon Bank, Manheim Township Police Department and Fulton Bank are GRANTED for exceeding the statute of limitations. “It is further ordered that the plff's (CATERBONE’S) Complaint is also dismissed as to defts (defendants) Southern Regional Police Department, Stone Harbor Police Department, Avalon Police Dept, Lancaster County Prison and Lancaster County Sheriff's Department For the reasons stated in the memorandum of Today's date. Further ordered that the plff's (CATERBONE’S) motion For an ex parte meeting with the court is denied as Moot.” Signed by judge Mary A. Mclaughlin.

On June 14, 2006 CATERBONE filed a REPLY to FUTLON BANK’S RESPONSE to CATERBONE’S Motion for an Ex Parte Meeting and argued the following: “PLAINTIFF (CATERBONE) filed the original complaint on May 16, 2005 prematurely due to the undo influence and intimidation of several DEFENDANTS’ and other persons, entities, and or organizations; specifically the threat of a fabricated criminal prosecution. PLAINTIFF readily recognized the deficiencies in the filing and the lack of a formal complaint (affidavit and finding of facts only), and had repeatedly requested information and procedural guidance from the Court during the course of time that had elapsed until the ORDER of the Honor on January 7, 2006. This had seemed especially difficult in light of the fact that the original filing was sealed. In 1998 PLAINTIFF stated to the courts the following: “I conclude that the courts must provide me with fair access to the law, and most certainly, the process must void any technical deficiencies found in this filing as being material to the conclusions. Such arrogance by the Courts would only challenge the judicial integrity of our Constitution”. PLAINTIFF (CATERBONE) acknowledges that the preceding statement contains an emotional response to the situation, and readily requests that the Court interprets the legal intention and merits of the PLAINTIFF’s request for a fair and reasonable access to the Court to hear and adjudicate the PLAINTIFF’s complaint.”

“PLAINTIFF has filed numerous formal complaints with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center. Those complaints identified as; I05120608348825 ; I05120804514805; and I06010506177009. Additionally complaints were filed with the Southern Regional Police Department of Conestoga, and the Lancaster County District Attorney’s Office with Chief Detective Michael J. Landis, during the course of the last 2 years, where the PLAINTIFF’S computer and online broadband connections was hacked. At times when PLAINTIFF attempted to search and find Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal and Pennsylvania) and related subject matters, including but not limited to the effective service for DEFENDANTS, certain provisions were missing and or replaced with erroneous and misinformation, thus resulting in an improper Certificate of Service and violation of the Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the Service of the complaint.”

On June 19,2006, the district court issued another ORDER regarding CATERBONE's Motion for an Ex Parte Meeting which stated in pertinent part: “[T]o the extent that the plaintiff is requesting leave to file an amended complaint:
1) the request shall be deemed a motion to file an amended complaint; and
2) the motion is GRANTED.
Although the Court DISMISSED many of the claims in the original complaint as time-barred, and the plaintiff has not attached a proposed amended complaint to demonstrate that he will be able to cure the deficiencies in the original complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to amend his pleadings once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000). No responsive pleading has yet been filed in this case.”

The district court did not, however, set forth a deadline, or did not specify a period of time by which CATERBONE was to file an Amended Complaint.
Accordingly, Fulton Bank filed a Motion to Establish a Deadline for CATERBONE to File an Amended Complaint, which was granted on July 20, 2006. In its order, the district court directed CATERBONE to file an Amended Complaint by August 20, 2006 and warned that if he failed to do so, the lawsuit would be dismissed with prejudice. FULTON BANK was intimidating CATERBONE and using it’s influence in the City of Lancaster and the County of Lancaster in deterring and thwarting CATERBONE’S due access to the courts. See civil actions CATERBONE v. City of Lancaster, et. al., and CATERBONE v. The County of Lancaster, et., al., filed on June 10, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.

On or about August 21, 2006, CATERBONE filed a Response to Fulton Bank's Motion to Establish a Deadline for Plaintiff to File an Amended Complaint. In his nine (9) page typewritten Response to Fulton Bank's Motion, CATERBONE asked the district court to grant him an "unspecified date" to comply with the court's order and file his Amended Complaint. CATERBONE cited several criminal citations recently issued against him (most of which have been dismissed and are contained in CATERBONE v. County of Lancaster District Attorney Office as false arrest complaints, the remaining few still under appeal in state courts); his on-going problems with his electrical provider and the illegal termination of his electricity in his home office; the time he had to spend in criminal courts appearing pro se, or vexatious litigation; and other civil lawsuits and complaints filed by him as the reason for the requested unspecified time period to amend this complaint.

By ORDER dated August 23, 2006, the district court GRANTED in part and DENIED in part CATERBONE's request for an "unspecified date" by which to amend his Complaint. The district court's order gave CATERBONE until September 6, 2006 to file an Amended Complaint or the case was to be dismissed, with prejudice.

Instead of filing an amended complaint, on September 6, 2006 CATERBONE filed a Notice of Appeal of the district court's ORDER directing him to file an Amended Complaint by September 6, 2006. Accompanying the Notice of Appeal was a twenty (20) page brief in support of his appeal. In the brief accompanying his Notice of Appeal, CATERBONE reiterates his request that he be granted an "unspecified date" by which to comply with the district court's ORDER to amend his Complaint "at least until Plaintiff can resume operations in his office at his residence at 220 Stone Hill Road, Conestoga, PA." without all of the obstruction of justice violations that was making it impossible to litigate this case. The matter of the specified date was before the Third Circuit of Appeals.

By ORDER dated July 3, 2007, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed CATERBONE's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In response to the Third Circuit's ORDER, on July 13, 2007, the district court issued an ORDER directing CATERBONE to file an Amended Complaint by August 15, 2007. The district court again warned CATERBONE that failure to do so would result in the dismissal of this case, with prejudice.

On July 24, 2007, CATERBONE filed a Motion for Continuance, seeking an extension of time until October 15, 2007 to file an Amended Complaint. CATERBONE's request for an extension was opposed by at least one defendant, MANHEIM TOWNSHIP POLICE DEPARTMENT. Notwithstanding, by ORDER dated July 25, 2007, the district court again granted CATERBONE's request for an extension of time to file an Amended Complaint. The district court established a new deadline of October 15, 2007, and specifically provided that if CATERBONE did not amend his complaint by that date, his case would be dismissed, with prejudice. The district court stated that no additional extensions of time would be granted.

On October 15, 2007 CATERBONE filed a 62 page Amended Complaint with the following preface “AND NOW on this 15th, day of October, 2007, I, Stanley J. Caterbone, PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Litigant, do hereby file before the Courts an AMENDMENT to the above case. The PLAINTIFF requests the Court to grant an additional 60 days to further amend this complaint and to amend and/or dismiss case no. 06-4650 (Mainly Obstruction of Due Process Complaints from 2005 to 2007) on or before December 15, 2007, at the time of the next amendment to this complaint. The PLAINTIFF also seeks clarification from the Court per the rules of original service; otherwise the PLAINTIFF will service all defendants, both original and the additional defendants per the 120-day rule after the filing of the next amendment to this complaint. The PLAINTIFF will also meet with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on October 15, 2007 at the time of this filing to report activities, which have prevented the PLAINTIFF from completing this amended complaint per the ORDER of July 25, 2007.”

CATERBONE researched how to file an “amended complaint” on the Internet and followed the only rules he could find from another U.S. Circuit Court. CATERBONE does not know if a computer hacker corrupted the documents in ORDER to sabotage his amended filing. CATERBONE followed the rules per adding new counts and defendants, as well as the servicing of original defendants versus new defendants added to the amended complaint.

In the Amended Complaint filed on September 15, 2007 CATERBONE also addressed the statute of limitations of the causes of actions in his complaint by the following:
1. “Legal Arguments and issues of the Statute of Limitations and Time Barred Causes of Actions that support that justice has been denied and due process subverted thus granting relief to the PLAINTIFFS:

a. (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; A claim may be barred by the statute of limitations if you discovered or reasonably should have discovered your injury four or more years ago.

b. Civil RICO claims are not subject to a statute of limitations. Congress failed to include a statute of limitations when it passed the RICO Act, but the United States Supreme Court has remedied that oversight and imposed a four-year statute of limitations on all civil RICO claims.

c. Civil Rico's statute of limitations begins to run when the victim discovers or reasonably should have discovered its injury. Once a victim is aware or should be aware of its injury, the victim has four years to discover the remaining elements of its claim and bring suit. A victim cannot sit on its rights and refrain from filing suit in the face of known injuries.

d. There are several equitable doctrines that may toll or suspend the running of the statute of limitations. If a defendant fraudulently conceals facts that are essential to the victim's ability to purse its rights, the running of the statute of limitations may be tolled.

e. Acts of duress, such as "if you sue me, I'll kill you," may toll the running of the statute of limitations.

f. All tolling doctrines are based upon whether it is fair, under the circumstances, to bar the victim's claims on the basis of the running of the statute of limitations.

g. If a defendant engages in a new pattern of racketing, that causes new and independent injuries, a new limitations period may apply to those new and independent injuries.

2. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (commonly referred to as RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; RICO is a United States federal law which provides for extended penalties for criminal acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Oct. 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 through 18 U.S.C. § 1968. RICO addresses long-term, not one-shot, criminal activity. Not only must a RICO claim be based upon criminal activity, but the criminal acts must constitute a "pattern" of criminal activity.

a. A single criminal act, short-term criminal conduct, or criminal actions that bear no relationship to each other will not give rise to a RICO claim. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that criminal actions constitute a "pattern" only if they are related and continuous.
 

b. In ORDER to be "related," the criminal acts must involve the same victims, have the same methods of commission, involve the same participants, or be related in some other fashion. A pattern may be sufficiently continuous if the criminal actions occurred over a substantial period of time or posed a threat of indefinite duration.

c. The former patterns are referred to as closed-ended patterns; the latter patterns are referred to as open-ended patterns.
d. Accordingly, even if you have been injured by a criminal act, you will not have a RICO claim unless that criminal act is part of a larger pattern of criminal activity.”

By ORDER dated October 22, 2007 (only 7 days after the amended complaint was filed), the district court dismissed the case, with prejudice, for failure to file a valid amended complaint. The Honorable Mary J. McLaughlin stated the following: “This new and, according to the plaintiff, incomplete complaint in this action named eight defendants; the instant Amendment to Complaint names several dozen defendants and includes 38 counts. Because the plaintiff has failed to file a valid amended complaint nearly 16 months after this Court granted him leave to do so, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.”

The district court's ORDER was entered the following day, on October 23, 2007.

On Friday, November 23, 2007, one day after the Thanksgiving Holiday (30th day) CATERBONE’s Notice of Appeal was recorded. On December 12, 2007 Judge Mary A. McLaughlin granted CATERBONE In Forma Pauperis status for his notice of appeal to the Third Circuit.

On December 12, 2007 CATERBONE (appeared personally at the U.S. Courthouse) filed a Motion for an Extension of Time to File a Response to the Question of Jurisdiction and on the same day filed a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel.

On December 13, 2007 CATERBONE filed a letter to the Clerk of Court of the Third Circuit Court with complaints of misconduct.

On December 19, 2007 CATERBONE filed another letter to the Clerk of the Third Circuit with more complaints of misconduct regarding this case.

On December 26, 2007 Fulton filed a Response to the question of jurisdiction in support to dismiss this appeal for failure to file an untimely appeal.

On January 15, 2008 the Court granted CATERBONE 21 additional days to file a Response to the question of jurisdiction.

Fulton wrote the following in it’s Response: “It is worth noting that during the almost sixteen (16) month period of time he was given to file an Amended Complaint, but failed to do so, CATERBONE did manage to file numerous other lawsuits, motions, briefs and appeals against countless defendants, utilizing reams of paper in the process.”

It is worth noting that since the filing of the original complaint on May 16, 2005, CATERBONE, has made numerous legitimate complaints of real allegations of misconduct and criminal activity regarding retaliation and intimidation that has prevented him from filing an amended complaint to law enforcement officials on the local, state, and federal level. The allegations included proven activities of computer and electronic hacking, theft of legal and business files, judicial misconduct, mail fraud, and provisions of the RICO anti-SLAPP statute. There have also been as many as 21 criminal citations, (vexatious litigation and false arrests) filed against CATERBONE since May 16, 2005 that have been Nolle Prosed, Dismissed, or Overturned on Appeal in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas; and prosecuted by the Lancaster County District Attorney. On December 20, 2006 while CATERBONE was falsely imprisoned in the Lancaster County Prison, The Lancaster County Sheriff’s Office and Fulton Bank illegally executed a sheriff sale on the office and residence of CATERBONE while the judgment and foreclosure were before the Pennsylvania Superior Court. To make matters worth, all of CATERBONE’s material possessions and contents of his residence at 220 Stone Hill Road, Conestoga, Pa, including all of his business and court filings, documents, and evidentiary materials; were stolen by Parula (Central Penn Property Services/Noble Real Estate) Properties. CATERBONE filed an insurance claim and numerous stolen property claims with law enforcement. The property and his vehicle were not found and returned until four (4) months later, on April 13, 2007.

On or about February 4, 2008 CATERBONE filed a Response to the Letter of Jurisdiction. CATERBONE argued that this Appeal should not be ruled untimely and be dismissed and cited Rule 6 (a) of the Rules of Federal Procedure (Computation of Time) and Rule 6 (d) (Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service). CATERBONE argued that the 30th day for filing of the Appeal fell on November 22, 2007, Thanksgiving Day, which is a legal Federal holiday. CATERBONE’s Notice of Appeal was filed in the Courts on November 23, 2007, the next legal business day, which is considered timely according to the Rules of Federal Procedure.

On March 27, 2008 the Court, Circuit Judges AMBRO, FUENTES and JORDAN ruled on the following:
1. By the Clerk for possible dismissal due to jurisdictional defect;
2. By the Clerk for possible dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or for possible summary action under I.O.P. 10.6;
3. Appellant’s jurisdictional response;
4. Jurisdictional Response by Fulton Bank;
5. Motion by Appellee, Manheim Township Police Department, to dismiss appeal; and
6. Appellant’s motion for appointment of counsel in the above captioned case.

The Court ORDERED: “The question of jurisdiction, and the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, are referred to the merits panel. See I.O.P. 10.3.5. We do not dismiss the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or take summary action under I.O.P. 10.6. The Clerk is directed to issue a briefing schedule. We note, however, that this ORDER does not represent a finding of appellate jurisdiction in this matter. As in all cases, the panel of this Court that reviews the appeal on it’s merits will make a final determination of appellate jurisdiction. In addition to any other issues the parties wish to raise in their briefs, the parties shall address whether the District Court erred in dismissing the case without addressing the factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984). The motion for appointment of counsel is denied.”

On April 22, 2008 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued a BRIEFING AND SCHEDULING ORDER. The ORDER issued the following:

1. It is ORDERED that the brief for the Appellant(s) and the joint appendix shall be filed and served on or before June 2, 2008.
2. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the brief(s) for the Appellee(s) shall be filed and served within (30) days of service of Appellant’s (Appellants’) brief.
3. It is FURTHER ORDERED that a reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served within (14) days of service of Appellant’s (Appellants’) brief.
4. It is FURTHER ORDERED that in the event of default by Appellant in filing the brief and appendix as directed, the appeal may be dismissed without further notice.
5. It is FURTHER ORDERED that if the Appellee fails to file a brief within the time directed, the matter will be listed on Appellant’s brief only and Appellee may be subject to such sanctions as the Court deems appropriate.

On May 9, 2008 CATERBONE filed a 12 page 30 day Request for Extension of Time of the Briefing Schedule extending the due date until July 2, 2008. CATERBONE cited 24 acts of harassment and intimidation within the City of Lancaster Pennsylvania and the County of Lancaster Pennsylvania that have prevented CATERBONE from filing and serving a brief as so ORDERED by the Court.

On May 27, 2008 CATERBONE was GRANTED a 30-day Extension of Time until July 2, 2008 to comply with the Briefing Schedule, as ORDERED by the Court.

On June 7, 2008 CATERBONE sent via USPS Priority mail 3 civil complaints in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, all of which were received and require additional forms for recording. In CATERBONE v. The City of Lancaster, et. al., CATERBONE outlines 2 or more years of abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating), violations of the Federal Torts Claim Act, libel, slander, and other counts against the Lancaster City Bureau of Police for not protecting his property and effects while in the courts. In CATERBONE v. The Lancaster County District Attorney’s Office, CATERBONE cites 15 false arrests since 2005; 60 days of false imprisonment; and 3 years of vexatious litigation against numerous defendants. In CATERBONE v. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, et., al., CATERBONE cites a false arrest; 7 months of an illegal revocation of CATERBONE’s Pennsylvania drivers license; abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating), and other civil torts. All of these complaints and civil torts have caused CATERBONE irreparable harm with the courts and were used as a weapon in vexatious litigation and resulted in a loss of time and interrupted his litigation thus obstructing justice in this and other cases.

6. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The ORDER under appeal of October 23, 2007 that DISMISSED this case by The Honorable Mary J. McLaughlin stated the following: “AND NOW, this 22nd day of October, 2007, upon consideration of the plaintiffs Amendment to Complaint and Motion for Continuance to further amend the complaint (Docket No. 61), and of the Court’s ORDER that the plaintiff’s amended complaint was due by October 15, 2007, and that the Court would grant no further extensions of time (Docket No. 58), IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED. This new and, according to the plaintiff, incomplete complaint in this action named eight defendants; the instant Amendment to Complaint names several dozen defendants and includes 38 counts. Because the plaintiff has failed to file a valid amended complaint nearly 16 months after this Court granted him leave to do so, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.”

The ORDER, which came only 7 days after the filing of CATERBONE’s amended complaint clearly did not consider that CATERBONE was pro se, nor was it consistent with Rule 15, and was an extreme sanction unwarranted by CATERBONE. The District Court erred and abused it’s discretion in not applying a merits analysis. In addressing the Distict Court’s assertion that CATERBONE should be sanctioned with dismissal for failure to file a [completed] amended complaint within a specified period, the Third Circuit clearly states in Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir.1982), that "dismissal is a drastic sanction and should be reserved for those cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff."

The Third Circuit clearly recognizes cases that warrant considerations and protection from abuse of discretion and erroneous rulings in the dismissal of cases with meritereous claims. The following excerpt from the opinion in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co supports this notion: “We recognize that recent literature exhorting the district judges to move litigation expeditiously by taking firm control and the 1983 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with their numerous references to sanctions may have contributed to premature dismissals or defaults. Although sanctions are a necessary part of any court system, we are concerned that the recent preoccupation with sanctions and the use of dismissal as a necessary "weapon" in the trial court's "arsenal" may be contributing to or effecting an atmosphere in which the meritorious claims or defenses of innocent parties are no longer the central issue. It does not further the goal of a court system, that of delivering evenhanded justice to litigants, to suggest, as did the district court here, that the plaintiffs would have a remedy by suing their counsel for malpractice, App. at 5, since this would only multiply rather than dispose of litigation.”

7. ARGUMENTS
a) Did the District Court Abuse It’s Discretion in it’s DISMISSAL on October 22, 2007 by not taking into consideration: that the APPELLANT (CATERBONE) was appearing pro se with special status with the right to liberal construction; all of the abuses and civil rights violations that the APPELLANT has brought to the District Courts attention in previous motions and pleadings; and that CATERBONE did not have a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct?

In addressing the district courts notion that the Amended Complaint was not complete CATERBONE had submitted a 62 page Amended Complaint to the district court. The Amended Complaint contained all of the necessary elements required to construct a complaint. The history and introduction were already part of the record in the district court. The Jurisdiction contained most of the federal statutes by name, however there were more that CATERBONE wanted to address but ran out of time. In the first paragraph of the Amended Complaint CATERBONE states: “AND NOW on this 15th, day of October, 2007, I, Stanley J. Caterbone, PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Litigant, do hereby file before the Courts an AMENDMENT to the above case. The PLAINTIFF requests the Court to grant an additional 60 days to further amend this complaint and to amend and/or dismiss case no. 06-4650 on or before December 15, 2007, at the time of the next amendment to this complaint. The PLAINTIFF also seeks clarification from the Court per the rules of original service; otherwise the PLAINTIFF will service all defendants, both original and the additional defendants per the 120-day rule after the filing of the next amendment to this complaint. The PLAINTIFF will also meet with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on October 15, 2007 at the time of this filing to report activities, which have prevented the PLAINTIFF from completing this amended complaint per the ORDER of July 25, 2007.”

On October 15, 2007 after filing the amended complaint in person to the Clerk of Courts Office in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Caterbone did meet with the Federal Bureau of Investigation at the Philadelphia Field Office, located in the same building, the U.S. Courthouse, and did report follow-up complaints.

CATERBONE was attempting to consolidate case 06-4650 (amended complaint was also due on the same day) with this case. some of the additional defendants and causes of actions were from that case, which the district court also sanctioned with DISMISSAL.

CATERBONE used rules of procedure regarding “Amendments to a complaint are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a)” and a document titled “How To Amend Your Complaint” which he researched on the internet. See Exhibit.

In addressing the Distict Court’s assertion that CATERBONE should be sanctioned with dismissal for failure to file an amended complaint within a specified period, the Third Circuit clearly states in Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir.1982), that "dismissal is a drastic sanction and should be reserved for those cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff." It is clear and on the record in CATERBONE v. City of Lancaster, et. al., and CATERBONE v. Lancaster County District Attorney Office, et. al., and in the numeorus complaints filed with the FBI and other law enforcement; that CATERBONE was burdened with violations of civil rights and other civil torts that have impeded his due process and resulted in obstruction of justice in denying CATERBONE fair due process to complete the amended complaint according to the courts mandated time schedule .

On June 14, 2006 CATERBONE filed a reply to FUTLON BANK’S RESPONSE to CATERBONE’S Motion for an Ex Parte Meeting and argued the following: “PLAINTIFF (CATERBONE) filed the original complaint on May 16, 2005 prematurely due to the undo influence and intimidation of several DEFENDANTS’ and other persons, entities, and or organizations; specifically the threat of a fabricated criminal prosecution.” CATERBONE was cited with several false arrests (7) after that reply was written. This accurately depicts the environment in which CATERBONE was trying to litigate this case in, while clearly and accurately illustrating the arrogance and maliciousness of those trying to have this case and CATERBONE from anything close to justice to right the 20 years of wrongs that he has endured.

CATERBONE has filed abuse of process complaints against local and state law enforcement for not protecting CATERBONE’s rights and due process in this case, as well as others . It is evident that those same said violations are still occurring today. That being the case, there is no clear record of delay or contumcious conduct by CATERBONE in failing to file the amended complaint according to the District Court’s deadline. Federal Torts Claims Act violations will be filed in the future.

It was not CATERBONEs’ actions or willful neglect was responsible for not adhering to the district courts ORDER of amending the complaint according the the Federal Rules of Procedure by the specified time period, September 15, 2007. CATERBONE was the victim of a vast array of misconduct, wrongdoing, and criminal acts that have obstructed his constitutional right to due process, which in itself made it impossible for CATERBONE to amend the complaint within the specified time period mandated by the District Court.

b)Did District Court err in dismissing the case without addressing the factors set forth in the merits analysis in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)?
The Third Circuit clearly recognizes cases that warrant considerations and protection from abuse of discretion and erroneous rulings in the dismissal of cases with meritereous claims. The following excerpt from the opinion in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co supports this notion:

“We recognize that recent literature exhorting the district judges to move litigation expeditiously by taking firm control and the 1983 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with their numerous references to sanctions may have contributed to premature dismissals or defaults. Although sanctions are a necessary part of any court system, we are concerned that the recent preoccupation with sanctions and the use of dismissal as a necessary "weapon" in the trial court's "arsenal" may be contributing to or effecting an atmosphere in which the meritorious claims or defenses of innocent parties are no longer the central issue. It does not further the goal of a court system, that of delivering evenhanded justice to litigants, to suggest, as did the district court here, that the plaintiffs would have a remedy by suing their counsel for malpractice, App. at 5, since this would only multiply rather than dispose of litigation.”

The Third Circuit further states: “We reiterate what we have said on numerous occasions: that dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions, termed "extreme" by the Supreme Court, National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781, and are to be reserved for comparable cases.”

The preceding opinion by the Third Circuit clearly and unoquivically was written to protect this case and others from an unjust and premature dismissal. The District Court should have addressed the factors of the merits analysis set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) in making a determination and the drastic sanction of an early DISMISSAL.

8. CONCLUSION
Law enforcement and the authorities must be made to bear the burden of their abuse of process (ignoring complaints and not investigating) and violations of the Federal Torts Claim Act. This corrupted environment denied CATERBONE his right to due process to properly amend this complaint by the specified time mandaed by the district court and according to the rules of procedure. The right of due process is clearly stated in Amendment XIV of the Untied States Constitution:
“Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

CATERBONE should not be made to bare that burden and compromise his right to due process with a consequence of the drastic and sever sanction and dismissal of this case.

The court should also recognize that CATERBONE is pro se and was denied his Motion For Counsel in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. CATERBONE included claims in his Amended Complaint that address misconduct, wrongdoing, and malice by as many as 5 highly qualified attorneys that selectively refused to properly advise and represent CATERBONE in the pursuit of the claims in this case from 1987 to 2005. By 2005, CATERBONE was left with no alternative but to appear pro se. The court would be excersising it’s right to administer justice while protecting the doctrines of equality to all that come before the courts with meritous claims for relief and redress by ruling in favor of CATERBONE.

The District Court should apply the merits analysis as outlined in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) and allow CATERBONE leave for an unspecified time to amend the complaint in this case and consider consolidating the complex cases filed by CATERBONE. The complexity of CATERBONE’s cases should not be made to compromise his right to due process of the law according the the XIV Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

Sanctions and Alternative Sanctions may be appropriate to grant CATERBONE relief for legal fees and costs, while attempting to litigate this case. CATERBONE is considered indegent by the district court to appear in forma pauperis, and proper redress would be appropriate. The levy of fines would be appropriate to consider against the guilty parties, namely Fulton Bank for filing the Motion to Establish a Deadline to Amend the Complaint on June 19, 2006 and appearing at least negligent as the lender in the illegal sheriff sale of his residence and subsequent stolen property ; and the Manhiem Township Police Department for filing motions which have delayed expeditious litigation in this case.

In Zucker v. Westinghouse, 374 F.3d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 2004) the Third Circuit Court recognized that, absent an expression of congressional intent to the contrary, a plaintiff’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees is not eliminated merely because he/she was pro se counsel.

Date: July 1, 2008 Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se
Advanced media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
mailto:amgroup01@msn.com
www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com


CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Amended Complaint will been served the 1st day of july of 2008, by first class mail, Postage prepaid, or by electronic mail upon (With Permission), or by hand deliver to:

Patricia Baxter, Esq.
Walter H. Swayze, III, Esq.
30 South 17th Street
Suite 1700, United Plaza
Philadelphia, PA 19103

George M. Gowen, 111, Esquire
Stuart A. Weiss, Esquire
Cozen O'Connor
1900 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 1 9103

Christopher S. Underhill, Esq.
Hartman, Underhill & Brubaker, LLC
221 East Chestnut Street
Lancaster, PA 17602

Stephanie Carfley, Esquire
Attorneys For Defendant Fulton Bank
126 East King Street
Lancaster, Pa 17602-2893


Robert W. Hallinger
Appel & Yost LLP
33 North Duke St
Lancaster, Pa 17602

                                                             ______________________________
Date: July 1, 2008                                     Stanley J. Caterbone, Pro Se
                                                              1250 Fremont Street
                                                              Lancaster, PA 17603
                                                              amgroup01@msn.com
                                                              http://www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com/


APPENDIX
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Page 23: I) Amended Complaint of September 15, 2007 filed by CATERBONE (Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,)
2. Page 23: II) Amended Complaint of September 15, 2007 filed by CATERBONE (Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,)

3. Page 24: III) Argument contained in the Response to the Jurisdictional Letter filed by CATERBONE on February 4, 2008(Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,)

4. Page 25: IV) Fulton Bank Response to CATERBONE Motion for Ex Parte Meeting with Judge McLaughlin(Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,)

5. Page 26: V) Letter of December 18, 2005 to the Honorable Judge Mary A. McLaughlin requesting an ex parte meeting sent by CATERBONE (Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,)

6. Page 28: VI) OPINION AND MEMORANDUM by the Honorable Mary J. McLaughlin filed on June 13, 2006(Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,)

7. Page 33: VII) Letter from CATERBONE to the Honorable Mary J. McLaughlin of January 9, 2007 (Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,)

8. Page 35: EXHIBITS

a. Page 35: October 22, 2007 ORDER of DISMISSAL by Judge McLaughlin

b. Page 36: November 20, 2007 Notice of Appeal to Third Circuit

c. Page 37: “How TO AMEND YOUR COMPLAINT”

d. Page 39: 747 F.2d 863 40 Fed.R.Serv.2d 313 Lefteri POULIS and Athena Poulis, his wife, Appellants, v. STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY. No. 83-5600. United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

e. Page 47: July 12, 2007 Letter to U.S. Senator Arlen Specter, Arlen Specter, United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510-3802

f. Page 49: July 16, 2007 Letter to Federal Bureau of Investigations, J. Edger Hoover Building, 935 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

g. Page 53: December 3, 2007 Letter to R. Scott Smith, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, Fulton Financial Corporation, One Penn Square, P.O. Box 4887, Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17604

h. Page 56: December 20, 2007 Letter to Supervisor, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Harrisburg Field Office, Harrisburg, PA 17108

i. Page 56(a): Attachments (Calendars) to the December 20, 2007 Letter to Supervisor, Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Harrisburg Field Office, Harrisburg, PA 17108

I) Amended Complaint of September 15, 2007 filed by CATERBONE (Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,):
“AND NOW on this 15th, day of October, 2007, I, Stanley J. Caterbone, PLAINTIFF, Pro Se Litigant, do hereby file before the Courts an AMENDMENT to the above case. The PLAINTIFF requests the Court to grant an additional 60 days to further amend this complaint and to amend and/or dismiss case no. 06-4650 (Mainly Obstruction of Due Process Complaints from 2005 to 2007) on or before December 15, 2007, at the time of the next amendment to this complaint. The PLAINTIFF also seeks clarification from the Court per the rules of original service; otherwise the PLAINTIFF will service all defendants, both original and the additional defendants per the 120-day rule after the filing of the next amendment to this complaint. The PLAINTIFF will also meet with the Federal Bureau of Investigation on October 15, 2007 at the time of this filing to report activities, which have prevented the PLAINTIFF from completing this amended complaint per the ORDER of July 25, 2007.”

II) Amended Complaint of September 15, 2007 filed by CATERBONE(Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,):

3. “Legal Arguments and issues of the Statute of Limitations and Time Barred Causes of Actions that support that justice has been denied and due process subverted thus granting relief to the PLAINTIFFS:

a. (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; A claim may be barred by the statute of limitations if you discovered or reasonably should have discovered your injury four or more years ago.

b. Civil RICO claims are not subject to a statute of limitations. Congress failed to include a statute of limitations when it passed the RICO Act, but the United States Supreme Court has remedied that oversight and imposed a four-year statute of limitations on all civil RICO claims.

c. Civil Rico's statute of limitations begins to run when the victim discovers or reasonably should have discovered its injury. Once a victim is aware or should be aware of its injury, the victim has four years to discover the remaining elements of its claim and bring suit. A victim cannot sit on its rights and refrain from filing suit in the face of known injuries.

d. There are several equitable doctrines that may toll or suspend the running of the statute of limitations. If a defendant fraudulently conceals facts that are essential to the victim's ability to purse its rights, the running of the statute of limitations may be tolled.

e. Acts of duress, such as "if you sue me, I'll kill you," may toll the running of the statute of limitations.

f. All tolling doctrines are based upon whether it is fair, under the circumstances, to bar the victim's claims on the basis of the running of the statute of limitations.

g. If a defendant engages in a new pattern of racketing, that causes new and independent injuries, a new limitations period may apply to those new and independent injuries.

4. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (commonly referred to as RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; RICO is a United States federal law which provides for extended penalties for criminal acts performed as part of an ongoing criminal organization. RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Oct. 15, 1970). RICO is codified as Chapter 96 of Title 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 through 18 U.S.C. § 1968. RICO addresses long-term, not one-shot, criminal activity. Not only must a RICO claim be based upon criminal activity, but the criminal acts must constitute a "pattern" of criminal activity.

a. A single criminal act, short-term criminal conduct, or criminal actions that bear no relationship to each other will not give rise to a RICO claim. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that criminal actions constitute a "pattern" only if they are related and continuous.

b. In ORDER to be "related," the criminal acts must involve the same victims, have the same methods of commission, involve the same participants, or be related in some other fashion. A pattern may be sufficiently continuous if the criminal actions occurred over a substantial period of time or posed a threat of indefinite duration.

c. The former patterns are referred to as closed-ended patterns; the latter patterns are referred to as open-ended patterns.
Accordingly, even if you have been injured by a criminal act, you will not have a RICO claim unless that criminal act is part of a larger pattern of criminal activity.”

III) Argument contained in the Response to the Jurisdictional Letter filed by CATERBONE on February 4, 2008(Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,):

“III. ARGUMENT - CATERBONE'S APPEAL OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER OF OCTOBER 22, 2007 IS TIMELY AND SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THIS COURT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE APPEAL.

According to Federal Rules of Procedure. Rule 6.(a) The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, or, when the act to be done is the filing of a paper in court, a day on which weather or other conditions have made the of6ee of the clerk of the district court inaccessible, in the event the period runs until the end of the next day which is not one of the aforementioned days. The last day, or the 30th day was November 22, 2007; which was Thanksgiving Day, a legal holiday according to the Rules of Federal Procedure and the Rules of Federal Appellate Procedure.

In addition, According to Federal Rules of Procedure Rule 6.(c) Additional Time After Certain Kinds of Service. Whenever a party must or may act within a prescribed period after service and service is made under Rule 5(B)(2)(b), (C), or (D), 3 days are added after the prescribed period would otherwise expire under subdivision (a). Service of the ORDER of October 23rd, 2007 by Judge McLaughlin was made by 1st class mail, which is included in Rule 5(B)(2)(b); which adds 3 days to the prescribed period.

The Notice of Appeal, filed on November 23, 2007 in the Clerk of Courts of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was timely. According to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 26. COMPUTING AND EXTENDING TIME (a) Computing Time. The following rules apply in computing any period of time specified in these rules or in any local rule, court order, or applicable statute:

(1) Exclude the day of the act, event, or default that begins the period.

(2) Exeluding intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays when the period is less than 11 days, unless stated in calendar days.

(3) Include the last day of the period unless it in a Saturday, Sunday, legal holiday, or-if the act to be done is filing a paper in court--a day on which the weather or other conditions make the clerk's office inaccessible.

(4) As used in this rule, "legal holiday" means New Year's Day, Martin Luther Kirrg, Jr.'s Birthday, Washington’s Birthday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans' Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and any other day declared a holiday by the President, Congress, or the state in which is located either the district court that rendered the challenged Judgment or order, or the circuit clerk's principal office.

According to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 26. Computing and Extending Time. (c) Additional Time After Service. When a party is required or permitted to act within a prescribed period after a paper is served on that party, 3 calendar days are added to the prescribed period unless the paper is delivered on the date of service stated in the proof of service. Three days shall be added to the 21 days required for this Response Regarding Jurisdiction to be filed.”

IV) Fulton Bank Response to CATERBONE Motion for Ex Parte Meeting with Judge McLaughlin(Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,):

FULTON BANK RESPONSE
Defendant, Fulton Bank, by and through its attorneys, Barley Snyder, LLC, hereby files the following Response in opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Ex Parte Meeting with the Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin: On or about June 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion requesting an ex parte meeting with the Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin "to discuss the problems of preceding, this action without obstruction of justice; and to amend the original complaint as discussed previously." See Plaintiffs Motion. However, Plaintiff provides no justification whatsoever for his request for an ex parte meeting with the Court. Rather, Plaintiff apparently labors under the false assumption that by proceeding pro se he is absolved of all responsibility to comply with the rules. Such is not the case. The fact that Plaintiff decided to be his own lawyer does not excuse him from following the rules of civil procedure or entitle him to any particular advantage for lack of legal training. "The right of self-representation is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom. Neither is it a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,834 n. 46,95 S.Ct. 2525,2541 n. 46,45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975).

V) Letter of December 18, 2005 to the Honorable Judge Mary A. McLaughlin requesting an ex parte meeting sent by CATERBONE (Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,):

December 18, 2005

Stanley J. Caterbone (pro se)
220 Stone Hill Road
Conestoga, PA 17516

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Honorable Judge Mary A. McLaughlin
Room # 13614
601 Market Street, Room 2609
Philadelphia, PA 19106-1748
Phone: (215) 597-7704
Fax: (215) 597-6390 600

Re: Case No. 05-2288

Honorable Judge Mary A. McLaughlin,

On Thursday, December 15th, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, I had my 341 Conference with Mr. Ward of the Trustee’s office of the Department of Justice, under oath. This meeting was recorded by Mr. Ward; the only persons present were a Security Officer of the courts, myself, and Mr. Ward. No creditors elected to attend.

During our meeting I was asked to determine the date of time in which I will be able to submit my reorganization plan to the courts as prescribed by law. My answer was that I have not had access to the above aforementioned case, and until I do, it would be difficult to develop such a plan. I had also given Mr. Ward my direct testimony why this case was filed prematurely, by myself, and the direct incidents which forced me to file this case on May 16, 2005, in well before I was able to complete my complaint for the courts.

Since the filing of the above sealed case, I have not had any access to this complaint, which has been necessary to amend, both the defendants list and the complaint itself.
I have attempted to correspond with the courts via facsimile and registered letter on numerous occasions for that very same purpose.

On October 28th, 2005, I had visited the Clerk of Courts to ascertain information regarding the same. It was on this day that the clerks instructed me to your chambers to inquire directly with you. If you recall, you and several of your clerks appeared before me in your chambers, at which time you cited ex parte rules. It was on the instructions of the clerks in the Clerk of Courts office that directed me to your chambers, since they were under someone’s direction not to provide me with any information concerning my case, or allow me access.

Since the filing of this case, on May 16, there have been many developments which directly support and prove my claims, all of which need to be addressed in my complaint.

There has also been numerous legal, political, and investigative issues in Washington, D.C., that have arisen regarding the sensitive National Security concerns that I have raised, and those must also be addressed in this case. As you are aware, there are at least 2 Grand Juries currently in progress concerning the same, both of which are under the direction of Special Prosecutor Mr. Fitzgerald in the Chicago Office of the Attorney General, and currently the proposed legislation for the Patriot Act. There has also been at least one Grand Jury appointed in the Lancaster County District Attorney’s office concerning many of my issues that I have defined in my complaint.

Within the past few weeks, I have had to file complaints with the IFCC of the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning the “hacking” and intrusion of my computer and related business activities (see attached).

In the past months, I have had numerous filings from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Lancaster County, courts that have been corrupted, intercepted, or never sent by the originator, where certificates of service were required by law. This is outlined in detail in my complaint with the Pennsylvania Judicial Review Board, case number ………, and can also be substantiated from the record of a preliminary hearing before District Magistrate Boyd, District… held on December 1, 2005.

Enclosed you will also find my Request for Appeal, filed with the Pennsylvania Housing Agency, on December 14, 2005, which addresses several issues that directly address several issues in the above aforementioned case.

I am requesting a Hearing to determine the status and the direction of this case, from you, or an officer of the courts with whom you select. I will provide a formal request, if required, as soon as possible.

Respectfully,


Stanley J. Caterbone
cc: Honorable Judge Thomas M. Twardowski, United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Mr. Hugh Ward, Department of Justice, Office of the United States Trustee, Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Mr. Donald Totaro, District Attorney, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Lancaster County

VI) OPINION AND MEMORANDUM by the Honorable Mary J. McLaughlin filed on June 13, 2006(Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,):

OPINION AND MEMORANDUM
The pro se plaintiff has made numerous allegations against numerous defendants in his eighty-seven page complaint The Court will dismiss the complaint as to moving defendants Mellon Bank (named as "Commonwealth National Bank"), Manheim Township Police Department, and Fulton Bank for failure to state a claim.

The Court will also dismiss the complaint as to non-moving defendants Southern Regional Police Department, Stone Harbor Police Department, Avalon Police Department, Lancaster County Prison and Lancaster County Sheriff's Department for failure to serve the complaint and summons.

I. Failure to State a Claim
Each of the moving defendants has moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to state a timely claim.' The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit permits 1 The pro se plaintiff has not opposed any of the motions to dismiss. By letter to the Court dated March 2, 2006, request filed March 6, 2006, and letter to the Court dated April 4, 2006, Fulton Bank, Manheim Township, and Mellon Bank respectively requested that their motions be granted as uncontested, pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.l(c). The United States Court o Appeals for the ~hird Circuit has indicated, however, that courts should not grant motions to dismiss against unrepresented parties without undertaking a merits analysis: Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991). defendants to raise a statute of limitations defense in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) if the time-bar is apparent on the face of the complaint. Robinson v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 135 (3d Cir. 2002).

The plaintiff's eighty-seven page complaint contains many allegations regarding numerous persons and entities. The plaintiff's sole allegation against Mellon Bank/Commonwealth National Bank, however, is that it wrongfully repossessed the plaintiff's airplane in July 1987.' According to the complaint, the Bank loaned the plaintiff $97,000 towards the purchase of an airplane in June 1987. The following month, before any payments were due, the Bank allegedly repossessed the plane, with all of the plaintiff's personal and business files on board. The plaintiff claims that the Bank sought to harm the plaintiff's business to reduce its competition in the mortgage banking and financial services businesses, in violation of the 'lender liability laws." (compl. 25, 31, 34, 37, 83, 3.)

I The plaintiff named "Commonwealth National Bank ((i.e. Mellon Bank)" as the defendant, but apparently attempted to effect service by sending a copy of the complaint to "Legal Counsel, Mellon Bank, N.A." (Doc. No. 8). According to Mellon Bank, Mellon formerly owned Commonwealth National. For the purposes of its current motion, Mellon accepted the plaintiff's attribution of Commonwealth National's actions to Mellon. (Mellon's Mot. to Dismiss Mem. at 1 n.1.)

The Court assumes that the plaintiff intended to name Mellon Bank as a defendant for the actions of Commonwealth National Bank, and will consider and grant Mellon Bank's motion to dismiss as described. If the plaintiff intended to sue only Commonwealth National Bank, however, the complaint would be dismissed as to Commonwealth National Bank for failure to effect service.

The plaintiff has not explicitly asserted any causes of action against the Bank. Construing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, however, the plaintiff has arguably asserted claims against the Bank for conversion, replevin, trespass, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and/or breach of contract arising out of the alleged repossession.

Plaintiffs bringing any of these claims must do so within two or four years. See 42 Pa. C.S. 5 5524(3) and ( 7 ) (imposing two year statute of limitations on any "action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including actions for specific recovery thereof,'' and "[a]ny other action or proceeding to recover damages for injury to person or property which is founded on negligent, intentional, or otherwise tortuous conduct or any other action or proceeding sounding in trespass, including deceit or fraud"); Glaziers & Glassworkers Union Local No. 252 Annuity Fund v. Newbridqe Sec., 93 F.3d 1171, 1186 (3d Cir. 1996) (a breach of fiduciary duty is tortious conduct, subject to a two year statute of limitations) ; 42 Pa.C.S. § 5525(a) (imposing four year statute of limitations on actions based on written, express, or implied contracts). The plaintiff initiated this lawsuit in May 2005, over seventeen years after the alleged repossession. It is clear from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff's claims against the Bank are time-barred.

I When considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (61, a court accepts all facts and allegations listed in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 249 (1989); Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989).

With respect to the Manheim Township Police Department, the plaintiff has alleged that: (11 when the plaintiff asked for help regarding the repossession of his airplane in July 1987, the Department's response was to ask "what bank branch repossessed your aircraft"; (2) on or around September 3, 1987, Detective Larry Sigler falsely charged the plaintiff with making terroristic threats; (3) on the same day, after the plaintiff was arrested for taking his own files from his own office, Detective Larry Mathias refused to take his statement or inform him of the charges against him, and unnamed officers used excessive force against him; and (4) in January 1991, a Lt. Madenspacher called the plaintiff regarding his letter to the Department of Defense about alleged blackmail occurring in 1987, but failed to attend a scheduled meeting. (Compl. at 5-6, 33, 39-40, 59.)

Again construing the allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, he has arguably asserted:

(1) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution and/or malicious abuse of process claims arising out of the charges and arrest in September 1987; and (2) civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983, arising out of the Department's actions or inactions in July and September 1987, and January 1991.

(2) The plaintiff's claims against the Manheim Township Police Department are also time-barred. Plaintiffs must bring any claims for intentional torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution and/or malicious abuse of process within two years. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5524(1).

Plaintiffs must also bring any 5 1983 civil rights claims within two years. Garvin v. Citv of Philadel~hia, 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2003) (1 1983 claims are subject to Pennsylvania's two statute of limitations governing personal injury actions). The plaintiff initiated this lawsuit more than fourteen years after his last alleged interaction with the Manheim Township Police Department.'

Finally, the plaintiff has alleged that Fulton Bank: (1) was involved in some sort of collusion in 1987; ( 2 ) embezzled $5,000 from his checking account in 1990, did not credit the account for more than 60 days, and never credited the lost interest income; and ( 3 ) refused to allow the plaintiff's brother, Thomas Caterbone, to deposit a check in 1996, on the grounds that no funds were available, and was therefore responsible for his suicide/wrongful death later that year. The plaintiff has also alleged that, in February 2005: (a) he had difficulty accessing certain account statements and was told that he had to pay for copies of those statements; and (b) a bank customer representative informed him that when a customer wants to deposit a check for which no funds are available, the bank must give the customer a choice between depositing the check or waiting until there are funds.

Finally, the plaintiff has included in his complaint what appears to be a May 6, 2005 article from the Intelligencer Journal that names Fulton Bank as a limited partner in Penn Square Partners, an alleged stakeholder in a proposed Lancaster County Convention Center. (Compl. at 6 ( a ) , 55-56, 80-81, 86.)

4 The complaint states that the plaintiff "rescinded efforts for due process immediately after loosing [sic] his home and business," but it also states that the plaintiff "began to review his case" again in October 1990. (Compl. at 5 6 . )

The plaintiff has arguably asserted claims against Fulton Bank for: (1) breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and/or unjust enrichment, for its actions toward the plaintiff in 1990; and (2)fraud or wrongful death, for its actions toward the plaintiff's brother in 1996. These claims are time barred as well. As explained above, there is a two-year statute of limitations on actions for breach of fiduciary duty or fraud. 42 Pa. C.S. $35524(3) and (7). There is a four-year statute of limitations on unjust enrichment, which is a quasi-contractual claim. 42 Pa. C.S. § 5525(4). Finally, there is a two-year statue of limitations on actions for wrongful death. 42 Pa. C.S. S 5524(2).

The plaintiff's reference to "collusion in 1987" on the part of Fulton Bank is too vague to state a claim for anything, even under the liberal notice pleading standards. Likewise, the plaintiff's allegations regarding his ability to access certain account statements in February 2005 does not state any recognizable claim. The plaintiff does not allege that it was illegal for Fulton Bank to charge to copies of account statements, or fraudulent for Fulton Bank to say that it charged. The plaintiff states only that he found the charge "disheartening," in light of the non-profit status of the account holder. (Compl. at 81.)

Similarly, the plaintiff's allegations regarding Fulton Bank's policy on depositing checks with insufficient funds, and its status as a limited partner in Penn Square Partners, do not state any claim of wrongdoing against Fulton Bank.

11. Failure to Serve the Complaint The Court will also dismiss the complaint as to the non moving defendants because the plaintiff has failed to properly serve the complaint and summons, and has therefore failed to compl) with the Court's January 5 , 2006 Order. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that service was valid. Grand Entertainment Grouw, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 488 (3d Cir. 1993).

The plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that he attempted to serve the Southern Regional Police Department. For each of the other defendants, the plaintiff filed a "Certificate of Service," certifying that the plaintiff mailed "the foregoing pleading to certain a named or unnamed individual(s) associated with the defendant, via certified mail. The plaintiff's attempts at service were improper as to the Lancaster County (Pennsylvania) Prison and Sheriff's Department, and the Stone Harbor and Avalon (New Jersey) Police department. Each of these defendants is an arm of a governmental organization.

Rule 4(j) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides Service upon a state, municipal corporation or other governmental organization subject to suit shall be effected by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive officer or by serving the summons and complaint in the manner prescribed bv 5 Mellon Bank, Manheim Township Police Department, and Fulton Bank also moved to dismiss for improper service. Because the Court is dismissing the complaint as against them for failure to state a claim, the Court need not decide the sufficiency of service as to these defendants, the law of that state for the service of summons or other like process upon any such defendant. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (j) (2) (emphasis added). Rule 422(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides : Service of original process upon a political subdivision shall be made by handing a copv to (1) an agent duly authorized by the political subdivision to receive service of process, or (2) the person in charge at the office of the defendant, (3) the mayor, or the president, chairman, secretary or clerk of the tax levying body thereof . . . . Pa. R. Civ. 0. 422(b) (emphasis added) Here, the plaintiff attempted to serve the Lancaster County Prison and Sheriff's Department by mailing a copy of the complaint to Howard L. Kelin at Kegel, Kelin, Almy & Grimm, LLP in Lancaster, Pennsylvania.' The plaintiff's attempt at service was improper under the federal and Pennsylvania rules of civil procedure because a copy of the complaint and summons were not personally served upon an appropriate person.

The New Jersey Court Rules also provide that the primary method of obtaining in personal jurisdiction over a ‘public body” defendant is to personally serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the public body's presiding officer, clerk or secretary, or on a person authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process on the public body's behalf. N.J. Court 6 By letter dated February 2, 2006 (on which the plaintiff was cc'd), Mr. Kelin informed the Court that he had been appointed Interim Special Counsel to Lancaster County, but was not an agent duly authorized to receive service of process.

R. 4 :4-4 (a) (1) and (8) . New Jersey permits plaintiffs to make service by mail, but provides that service by mail is only effective if the defendant answers the complaint or otherwise appears in response thereto. If defendant does not answer or appear within 60 days following mailed service, the plaintiff must make personal service. N.J. Court R. 4:4-4(c).

The plaintiff attempted to serve the Stone Harbor Police Department by mailing the complaint to Michael Donahue, an attorney at law in Stone Harbor, New Jersey, on January 17, 2006. The plaintiff also attempted to serve the Avalon Police Department by mailing the complaint to Stephen Basse, an attorney at law in Vineland, New Jersey, on that date. The plaintiff's attempts to make service by mail were ineffective under federal or New Jersey law because neither the Stone Harbor or Avalon Police Departments have answered or otherwise responded to the complaint in well over 60 days. Moreover, the plaintiff has not shown that Mr. Donahue or Mr. Basse are the appropriate persons to receive service for these public bodies.

VII) Letter from CATERBONE to the Honorable Mary J. McLaughlin of January 9, 2007 (Case No. 05-cv-2288 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et. al.,):

January 9, 2007

Stan Caterbone
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603

The Honorable Judge Mary A. McLaughlin, J.
The United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
601 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19101

Re: Case No. 05-2288; 06-4650; 06-5138; 06-4734; 06-CV-4154; 06-5117; 06-2236; 05-23059BKY

Your Honor;

I am writing to notify the Courts that I have been released from the Lancaster County Prison on December 29, 2006 at 3:30pm Eastern Standard Time. Unfortunately I have been unable to contact you prior to this time because of my pressing criminal Court schedule and the fact that I had no funds available to purchase paper or postage. As you can see from the attached, I was at least falsely imprisoned , and was released upon the success of my Appeal in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County .

I allege that the imprisonment was meant as another means of harassment and intimidation, and therefore used to obstruct my Right to Due Process and Access to the Courts. The Civil Conspiracy to undermine my efforts to file my Federal False Claims Act violations and the above cases continues to this day.

Would you kindly copy this correspondence and circulate the attached to the other Judges presiding over the above cases? I also have lost all of the files and evidence that are material to these matters as explained in the Addendum to the Petition to Set Aside the Sale. I am requesting another Continuance until further notice and again am requesting an Ex-Parte meeting with Your Honor.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Respectfully,


Stan J. Caterbone
EXHIBITS


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE CASE OF:

STANLEY J. CATERONE : CIVIL ACTION
: Case No. 05-2288
LANCASTER COUNTY PRISON, et.al.


ORDER

AND NOW this 22nd day of October, upon consideration of the Plaintiff’s Amendment to Complaint and Motion for Continuance to further amend the complaint (Docket No. 61) and of the Court’s Order that the Amended Complaint was due by October 15, 2007 and the Court would grant no further extensions of time, (Docket No. 58) IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
“This new and, according to the plaintiff, incomplete complaint in this action named eight defendants; the instant Amendment to Complaint names several dozen defendants and includes 38 counts. Because the plaintiff has failed to file a valid amended complaint nearly 16 months after this Court granted him leave to do so, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.”


BY THE COURT,

MARY A. MCLAUGHLIN, J.
EXHIBIT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Stanley J. Caterbone :
              PLAINTIFF :
:
v. :                                              CASE NO. 05-2288 : :
Lancaster County Prison, et al. :

NOTICE OF APPEAL


Notice is hereby given that Stanley J. Caterbone, in the above named case, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit from an ORDER that failed to consider the Amended Complaint, DENIED Motion for Continuance to further amend the complaint, and DISMISSED the above captioned case, entered in this action on the 22nd day of October, 2007.



Date: November 20, 2007 Stanley J. Caterbone, Pro Se Litigant
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603
amgroup01@msn.com
http://www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com/

EXHIBIT

“HOW TO AMEND YOUR COMPLAINT”

If you have forgotten to state an important matter in your complaint, you discover something new after you filed your complaint, you want to add a defendant, or you want to insert the true name of a “John Doe” defendant, you may be able to file an amended complaint. An amended complaint does not just add to the first complaint. Once you file an amended complaint it entirely replaces your original complaint.

Amendments to a complaint are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a) provides that:

A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer, unless the court otherwise orders.

This means that if the defendant has not yet filed an answer to your complaint, you can file one amended complaint without permission of the Court. If the defendant has filed a motion to dismiss but has not filed an answer, you are still entitled to file one amended complaint without permission. (You are only permitted to file one amended complaint before defendant files an answer; if you wish to file a second amended complaint before defendant files an answer, you must obtain defendant’s consent or you must obtain permission from the Court). However, if the defendant has already filed his answer to your complaint, you must get written consent from the defendant or permission of the Court before amending your complaint. If the defendant agrees in writing that you can file an amended complaint, you must ask the judge to write “So Ordered” on the written consent, indicating that the judge has approved the consent. If the defendant does not give you written consent, you can ask permission from the Court by filing a motion to amend the complaint and including a copy of the proposed amended complaint with your motion papers. Instructions for preparing a motion are attached and are available separately.

If you file an amended complaint. It must be captioned as an “Amended Complaint.”

2
FILING AND SERVING THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
SERVICE OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT HAS BEEN SERVED
If you decide to amend your complaint before defendant has been served with your original complaint and summons, you should serve the amended complaint on defendant and file the original amended complaint with the Pro Se Office as follows:
1. Make copies of your amended complaint.
2. Keep one copy for your own records.
3. File the original of your amended complaint with the Pro Se Office.
4. If you have not added new defendants in your amended complaint, use the summons that was originally issued by the Court.
5. Have a copy of the summons and a copy of the amended complaint served on each defendant by someone who is over eighteen and is not a party to the action. The original summons with the seal of the court embossed on it must be returned to the Court, so do not serve the original summons on any defendant.
6. Have the person who serves the summons and amended complaint on each defendant complete an affidavit or affirmation of service of process form.
7. Make a copy of the affidavit or affirmation of service of process and keep it for your own records.
8. Attach the original affidavit or affirmation of service to the original summons.
9. File the original summons and the affidavit or affirmation of service of process with
the Pro Se Office.

SERVICE OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AFTER THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT HAS BEEN SERVED ON ALL DEFENDANTS
If you decide to amend your complaint after the defendant has been properly served with your original complaint and summons (and you have not added any new defendants in your amended complaint), you should take the following steps:
1. Make copies of your amended complaint.
2. Keep one copy for your own records.
3. Send a copy of your amended complaint to the attorney for each defendant by ordinary first-class mail.
4. Complete an affidavit or affirmation of service of process form stating that the amended complaint was mailed to each defendant.
5. Make a copy of the affidavit or affirmation of service of process and keep it for your own records.
6. File the original amended complaint and your original affidavit or affirmation of service of process with the Pro Se Office.

DELIVERY OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AFTER THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT HAS BEEN SERVED ON SOME DEFENDANTS BUT NOT ON OTHERS

If you decide to amend your complaint after some defendants have been served with your original complaint and summons but before other defendants have been served (or you have added new defendants in your amended complaint), you should take the following steps:
1. Make copies of your amended complaint.
2. Keep one copy for your own records.
3. Send a copy of your amended complaint by ordinary first-class mail to each defendant who has already been served.
4. Complete an affidavit or affirmation of service of process form stating that the amended complaint and summons was mailed to each defendant.
5. Make a copy of the affidavit or affirmation of service of process and keep it for your own records.
6. File the original amended complaint and original affidavit or affirmation of service of process with the Pro Se Office.
7. If you have not added new defendants in your amended complaint, you must serve the amended complaint on the defendant who has not yet been properly served. If you have added new defendants, the Court will issue an amended summons, which must be served with the amended complaint. If you are adding defendants, you must bring this to the attention of the Pro Se Writ Clerk.
8. Have a copy of the amended summons and a copy of the amended complaint served 4 pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules on any defendant who was not previously served with the original complaint.
9. Have the person who served the amended summons and the amended complaint to each of the new defendants complete an affidavit or affirmation of service of process form.
10. Make a copy of the affidavit or affirmation of service of process.
11. Attach the affidavit or affirmation of service of process to the amended summons.
12. File the original amended summons and the original affidavit or affirmation of service of process with the Pro Se Office.

If you have questions regarding any of the procedures listed above, please contact the Pro Se Office at 718-613-2665.

EXHIBIT

747 F.2d 863
40 Fed.R.Serv.2d 313
Lefteri POULIS and Athena Poulis, his wife, Appellants,
v.
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.
No. 83-5600.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
Argued April 3, 1984.
Decided Nov. 5, 1984.
George Retos, Jr. (Argued), Retos, Held & Associates, Washington, Pa., for appellants.
Paul K. Geer (Argued), Jones, Gregg, Creehan & Gerace, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before GIBBONS, SLOVITER, Circuit Judges, and BISSELL, District Judge*.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.
1
This appeal, as well as another decided today involving the same attorney and district court judge, Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, is brought from a final order dismissing the complaint with prejudice due to counsel's failure to meet court-imposed deadlines and other procedural requisites.
I.
Background
2
Lefteri and Athena Poulis filed suit against State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) in November 1981, in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Pennsylvania, to recover under an insurance policy after fire damaged their home. State Farm removed the case to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania based on diversity of citizenship. In its answer, it denied liability, asserting that plaintiffs had intentionally caused the fire, had concealed and misrepresented information, and had not filed their action in time.
3
On March 12, 1982, the district court ordered that discovery would close June 14, 1982; that plaintiffs' pre-trial statement would be due July 5; and that defendant's statement would be due July 26. A pre-trial conference was set for August 13. The docket reveals no action by plaintiffs seeking discovery. On April 15, State Farm filed notice of service of interrogatories on plaintiffs. No answers to these interrogatories were or have ever been filed, and plaintiffs did not file their pre-trial statement by July 5 as required. Therefore defendant filed its pre-trial statement first, on July 28, together with a motion to compel answers to interrogatories. A member of the district judge's staff advised plaintiffs' counsel, George Retos, Jr., that the statement was overdue and Retos promised to submit a statement by the next day. He neither did so nor requested any extension. On August 5 the district court, sua sponte, dismissed the case with prejudice for plaintiffs' failure to comply with the orders to file the pre-trial statement.
4
Retos filed a pre-trial statement on August 9, together with a motion under Rule 60(b) to reconsider and set aside the dismissal, alleging that an illness prevented him from working between July 6 through July 17; that other attorneys could not have taken over because only Retos spoke Greek and could communicate with plaintiff Lefteri Poulis; that Retos' pregnant wife went into false labor on July 29 and 30, and that he had "inadvertently set aside the required work for the instant case on July 29, 1982, due to his concern for his wife" and was "render[ed] unable to prepare the necessary Pre-Trial Statement;" that on his return to work other tasks had backlogged; and that although he had dictated a statement on August 4, it had been mailed on August 6 when it was typed and ready.
5
The district court denied reconsideration. On appeal, this court vacated the order of dismissal. Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 714 F.2d 124 (3d Cir.1983) (Poulis I ) (per curiam). We noted there was "no allegation that plaintiffs, as distinguished from their counsel, were in any way responsible for the failure to comply with the court's order." We recognized that in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 96 S.Ct. 2278, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976), a dismissal was upheld where plaintiffs had acted in "flagrant bad faith" and counsel "had behaved with 'callous disregard' of [his] responsibilities," id. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781, but observed that "[t]he case at hand is not as extreme."
6
We pointed out that in an earlier opinion, Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir.1982), we had stated that "dismissal is a drastic sanction and should be reserved for those cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff." However, because Retos' excuses failed to account for many days on which a pre-trial statement could have been filed, we observed that some sanction was "amply justified." Accordingly, we vacated the dismissal and remanded to permit the district court to consider alternatives to dismissal, stating, "Alternatives are particularly appropriate when the plaintiff has not personally contributed to the delinquency."
7
On remand, the district court ordered the parties to file briefs on appropriate alternative sanctions. Plaintiffs' brief, filed four days late, stated that such sanctions would be costs, attorneys' fees, and monetary penalties imposed on him, but argued that "[s]ince the Third Circuit has specifically assessed the costs of the appeal in this matter against plaintiffs' counsel personally, it has ruled on the sanctions which are to be applied in the instant matter [and] alternative sanctions are now inappropriate." App. at 10-11.
8
In its brief State Farm took a more reasonable position. It noted that "[i]n this case the defendant has been more prejudiced by plaintiffs' failure to answer interrogatories then [sic] by its counsel's failure to file the Pre-Trial Statement on time." App. at 16. State Farm urged the court to reopen discovery so that it could "have the opportunity to examine plaintiffs' Answers to Interrogatories, conduct further investigation if necessary, and depose the plaintiffs or other witnesses known to plaintiffs if such action is deemed necessary and appropriate." App. at 15. State Farm suggested, "If discovery is reopened, State Farm believes there would be no need to utilize the somewhat harsh remedy of limiting or restricting plaintiffs' witnesses at trial." App. at 16 (emphasis added). In light of this court's order, State Farm requested an award of $750.00 in attorneys' fees which it incurred because of the dismissal and appeal, and sought a prospective limitation on interest due should it ultimately be held liable on plaintiffs' claim.
9
Significantly, in its brief State Farm further stated, "State Farm strongly believes that the most expeditious manner of disposing of this case can be provided by ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss which was filed on July 7, 1982," approximately three weeks following the close of discovery and which was denied by the district court because of its policy not to consider motions to dismiss filed more than two weeks after the close of discovery. App. at 16.
10
Notwithstanding the defendant's submission, the district court reinstated its sua sponte sanction of dismissal, stating that there was no appropriate alternative:
11
There are no costs which can be charged to plaintiffs' counsel at this point. Further, this was not a situation in which defense counsel was forced to make an unnecessary trip to court because of plaintiffs' counsel's failure to appear. The defendant has only been required to incur fees in an amount that would have been incurred if the case normally proceeded to this point. Thus, this is not an appropriate case for attorney's fees. Finally, the court finds no authority for levying a fine against plaintiffs' counsel as a penalty. Rather than imposing fines and costs of [sic] other sanctions prior to dismissal, plaintiffs' counsel was afforded many opportunities to cure the problems, but he has failed to do so. Sanctions not being appropriate, the court has no alternative but dismissal to motivate plaintiff's counsel to comply with deadlines.
12
App. at 3-4 (footnotes and citation omitted). The district court intimated its displeasure with the remand in Poulis I but it was unequivocal in its disagreement with the remand in a similar case from another district, Titus v. Mercedes Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746 (3d Cir.1982). The district court stated: "Judge Garth's dissent in Titus, indicates that deliberate, dilatory action is a basis for dismissal, even under Donnelly, and further indicates that the Circuit Court should only reverse such a decision for abuse of discretion.... [T]his Court finds Judge Garth's dissent persuasive and adopts his dissent, and the cases cited therein, as further support for this decision." App. at 5 (emphasis added).
13
We treat this extraordinary statement at the outset. Whatever may be the personal views of the district court as to the merits vel non of a decision of this court, the district court is not free to "adopt" the dissent. This court is strict in its adherence to the precedent of its earlier opinions. Our own Internal Operating Procedures are explicit and provide,
14
It is the tradition of this court that reported panel opinions are binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to overrule a published opinion of this court.
15
Internal Operating Procedures of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Chapter 8.C. If the judges of this court are bound by earlier panels, a fortiori district court judges are similarly bound. Recognition of the hierarchical nature of the federal judiciary requires no less.
16
Moreover the reported decisions of this court over the past two years evidence the consistency of this court's rulings emphasizing the extreme nature of a dismissal with prejudice or default judgment. See Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir.1984); In re MacMeekin, 722 F.2d 32 (3d Cir.1983); Madesky v. Campbell, 705 F.2d 703 (3d Cir.1983); Gross v. Stereo Component Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.1983); Titus v. Mercedez Benz of North America, 695 F.2d 746 (3d Cir.1982); Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653 (3d Cir.1982); Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.1982); Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339 (3d Cir.1982).1
17
We recognize that recent literature exhorting the district judges to move litigation expeditiously by taking firm control and the 1983 amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with their numerous references to sanctions may have contributed to premature dismissals or defaults. Although sanctions are a necessary part of any court system, we are concerned that the recent preoccupation with sanctions and the use of dismissal as a necessary "weapon" in the trial court's "arsenal" may be contributing to or effecting an atmosphere in which the meritorious claims or defenses of innocent parties are no longer the central issue. It does not further the goal of a court system, that of delivering evenhanded justice to litigants, to suggest, as did the district court here, that the plaintiffs would have a remedy by suing their counsel for malpractice, App. at 5, since this would only multiply rather than dispose of litigation.
18
We reiterate what we have said on numerous occasions: that dismissals with prejudice or defaults are drastic sanctions, termed "extreme" by the Supreme Court, National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781, and are to be reserved for comparable cases.
II.
Analysis
19
In exercising our appellate function to determine whether the trial court has abused its discretion in dismissing, or refusing to lift a default, we will be guided by the manner in which the trial court balanced the following factors, which have been enumerated in the earlier cases, and whether the record supports its findings: (1) the extent of the party 's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.
20
We turn to apply these factors in the circumstances of this case.
21
1. The extent of the party's personal responsibility.
22
There has been no suggestion by any party or by the district court that the Poulis plaintiffs are personally responsible for the late pretrial statement, which was the basis for the dismissal. Indeed, Retos has acknowledged the delays were his responsibility and assigned as the reason his illness from July 6 through 17 and the subsequent false labor of his wife on July 29 and 30.
23
This is therefore unlike the National Hockey League case where the Supreme Court upheld the "extreme sanction of dismissal" after noting that there had been "flagrant bad faith" on the part of the plaintiffs as well as "callous disregard" by their counsel of their responsibilities. 427 U.S. at 643, 96 S.Ct. at 2781. However, the Poulis' lack of responsibility for their counsel's dilatory conduct is not dispositive, because a client cannot always avoid the consequences of the acts or omissions of its counsel. See Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 633, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962).
24
2. Prejudice to the adversary.
25
As the district court stated, there has been prejudice to the defendant by the plaintiffs' counsel's conduct. The interrogatories were never answered nor were objections filed; defense counsel was obliged to file a motion to compel answers, and was obliged to file its pretrial statement without the opportunity to review plaintiffs' pretrial statement which was due to be filed first. App. at 4. The court's finding that "defendant encountered lack of cooperation from the plaintiff in areas where the plaintiff should cooperate under the spirit of the federal procedural rules," id., is supported by the record.
26
3. A history of dilatoriness.
27
As noted above, this litigation has been characterized by a consistent delay by plaintiffs' counsel. Unlike the Donnelly case, for example, where there was only one failure to comply in a timely manner, i.e. in obtaining local counsel, in this case there has been a pattern of dilatoriness. Time limits imposed by the rules and the court serve an important purpose for the expeditious processing of litigation. If compliance is not feasible, a timely request for an extension should be made to the court. A history by counsel of ignoring these time limits is intolerable.
28
4. Whether the attorney's conduct was willful or in bad faith.
29
Although the district court concluded that "plaintiffs' counsel's conduct [was] of such a dilatory and contumacious nature to require dismissal," App. at 5, there is nothing in the record to support the "contumacious" finding. Nothing in the court's discussion preceding this conclusion is directed toward the willfulness issue but only toward dilatoriness. There has been no suggestion or indication that counsel's illness during July 1982 and his wife's late pregnancy and false labor at the end of that month did not occur as he represented.
30
In the appellants' brief, counsel characterizes his conduct as "excusable neglect" and seeks to explain the district court's characterization of his conduct as "deliberate" and "contumacious" as the result of a "personality conflict" between counsel and the district judge. Appellants' brief at 8. He refers us to four recent appeals in which he allegedly "clashed" with the same district judge.2 However, even in those cases in which we vacated the dismissal, the record showed that counsel failed to comply with the rules and deadlines imposed by the district court. Thus, while some disaffinity has apparently been engendered between the district judge and counsel we see no basis to hold the district judge responsible. Nonetheless, as noted at the beginning of this section, we also find no basis for terming counsel's conduct in this case "contumacious".
31
5. Alternative sanctions.
32
The district court concluded that it had "no alternative but dismissal" because no other sanctions were appropriate. The district court stated that there was no authority for levying a fine against plaintiffs' counsel as a penalty. See Gamble v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.) (in banc), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888, 83 S.Ct. 187, 9 L.Ed.2d 123 (1962).3 However, the court also stated that "there are no costs which can be charged to plaintiffs' counsel at this point." This finding was erroneous. Defendant's counsel had asked the court to impose as a sanction the $750 attorney fee which it had incurred in defending the appeal in Poulis I. The district court apparently assumed that the costs of that appeal had already been charged to plaintiffs' counsel. However, we had not assessed any attorney's fee as part of our imposition of appeal costs on plaintiffs' counsel personally.4 The district court also could have imposed on plaintiffs' counsel the costs, including attorney's fees, of preparing the motion to compel answers to interrogatories and the brief on alternative sanctions, all of which were incurred because of the dilatoriness of plaintiffs' counsel.
33
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 1983 amendments, the district court is specifically authorized to impose on an attorney those expenses, including attorneys' fees, caused by unjustified failure to comply with discovery orders or pretrial orders. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f), 37(a)(4), 37(b), 37(d) and 37(g). See also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1927. The most direct and therefore preferable sanction for the pattern of attorney delay such as that which the district court encountered in this case would be to impose the excess costs caused by such conduct directly upon the attorney, with an order that such costs are not to be passed on to the client, directly or indirectly. This would avoid compelling an innocent party to bear the brunt of its counsel's dereliction. Dismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.
34
6. Meritoriousness of the claim.
35
In considering whether a claim or defense appears to be meritorious for this inquiry, we do not purport to use summary judgment standards. A claim, or defense, will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff or would constitute a complete defense. See United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d at 195; Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d at 657; Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d at 764.
36
In this case, the defendant suggested to the district court that the most expeditious way to process this litigation was to rule on its motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim as untimely because it was not brought within a year of the loss, as required by the policy. The district court's denial of that motion because of its "policy ... not to consider motions to dismiss filed more than two weeks after the close of discovery," Order of August 2, 1982, appears to conflict with Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2) which permits a defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted to be raised by motion as late as at the trial on the merits. Since the motion was timely under Rule 12(h) because it was pleaded in the answer, its consideration by the district court might have avoided the entire controversy regarding the pretrial proceedings and the two appeals to this court, and could have given the parties a disposition on the merits.5
37
Certainly, the defense that the plaintiffs' claim must fail because it has not been brought within the one year limitation provision of the policy is, on its face, compelling. See Schreiber v. Pennsylvania Lumberman's Mutual Ins. Co., 498 Pa. 21, 444 A.2d 647 (1982). In their complaint plaintiffs made no allegation that would avoid this facial untimeliness by invoking Pennsylvania's law of waiver of the time limit set forth in an insurance policy. See Commonwealth v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 462 Pa. 268, 341 A.2d 74 (1975). Moreover, plaintiffs filed no answer to the motion to dismiss. For the purpose of evaluating the facial validity of the claim or defense, we cannot rely on the vague and nonspecific statements in plaintiffs' pretrial memorandum that they would produce witnesses to show that defendant led them to believe they would not be barred from filing an action on the claim more than 12 months from the date of the fire. While we express no opinion on whether summary judgment or dismissal would have been warranted on this ground, the existence of a prima facie defense is a factor to be weighed along with the foregoing factors.
III.
Conclusion
38
The above factors should be weighed by the district courts in order to assure that the "extreme" sanction of dismissal or default is reserved for the instances in which it is justly merited. In this case, although there was no contumacious behavior, the pattern of dilatory behavior is compounded by the plaintiffs' failure to file any answers to interrogatories, defendant was compelled to file its pretrial statement without such answers and without seeing plaintiffs' pretrial statement, and there is a prima facie defense to the claim. Under these circumstances, although we might not have reached the same result as did this district court judge, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the dismissal. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.
*
Hon. John W. Bissell, United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation
1
We believe it important to point out that we have not hesitated to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions, including dismissals in appropriate cases, cf. United States v. $55,518.05 in U.S. Currency, 728 F.2d 192 (3d Cir.1984) (default judgment) (in which Judge Garth dissented on the ground that the dispute was prematurely ended without being reviewed on the merits), although under our procedures that is often done by judgment order affirmance
2
In two of these cases, this one and Scarborough v. Eubanks, also decided today, 747 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.1984), the district court dismissed the complaint, and in the third, the court entered a default judgment against Retos' client, Miller v. Blower, No. 82-0757 (W.D.Pa. Feb. 2, 1983), vacated and remanded, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir.1984) (unreported). The fourth case, United States v. Golna, No. 81-179 (W.D.Pa.) aff'd, 714 F.2d 125 (3d Cir.1983) (unreported), was not appealed on the basis of any sanctions imposed by the district court
3
This issue is presently pending before this court in Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., No. 83-5664 (order for in banc consideration filed Oct. 11, 1984)
4
It was a non sequitur for plaintiff to have argued in his brief on alternative sanctions filed with the district court that since we specifically assessed the costs of the appeal against him personally, we already ruled on the sanctions to be applied. If so, there would have been no basis for us to have remanded for precisely this purpose
5
In this connection we note the commendable procedure followed by Judge Grady of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, who has found that attention to some of the legal issues during a discovery conference called under Rule 26(f) has substantially reduced the need for discovery. See Grady, Finding Our Way Through the Discovery Jungle, 21 The Judges' Journal 4, 42-43 (1982).
CC∅ | TRANSFORMED BY PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG

EXHIBIT

July 12, 2007


Stan Caterbone, Pro Se Litigant
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603


Arlen Specter
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-3802

Re: Letter of June 15, 2007

Dear Mr. Specter:

I appreciate your letter of June 15, 2007 and the future of the Federal Courthouse in Lancaster County. I don’t think that there is anything more important than the integrity of our judicial system. As you are aware, I am following the Attorney General controversy and would hope that your committee is successful in restoring the tradition of respect and integrity into that institution. I don’t see how our great country can function with respect without that happening. I would hope that Attorney General Gonzales takes the high road and resigns in the very near future, for the greater good.

Unfortunately, I have some personal and business issues that I consider important enough for me to seek your help, as being one of my representatives to the United States Senate. First of all, I received your letter yesterday, July 11, 2007. It was held in the mail system or was stolen for almost a full 30 days. I have had so many complaints regarding the same that I filed a complaint with the United States Postal Inspector. They had written me but I never did receive the follow-up to the Investigation as the letter promise. I am attaching a copy of the letter with the hopes that you could follow-up and make certain that my complaint is not being subverted.

If you are not aware, I have a Federal Whistle-Blowing and Federal False Claims Act case that I need to file against the United States Attorney General, as required by law. This case involves the former Department of Defense contractor International Signal & Control, Plc, (ISC) formerly of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, I also have an unprecedented case of obstruction of justice that surrounds that case, and I am evaluating the merits of waiting until your subcommittee finds a resolution to U.S. Attorney General controversy before I file my action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. I am certain that any filing before would only be subject to further misconduct. My cases now before the United States District Courts and the various Courts of the Commonwealth have been subject to an unprecedented array of judicial misconduct. However, I realize that you do not have the authority or the jurisdiction to intervene, so I am told. There is a problem that I must bring to your attention in the hopes that you would be able to at least refer me to the appropriate committees or agency. For approximately the past 19 months I have had the ability to communicate telepathically. I have spent much time researching this ability through the various intelligence agencies declassified documents.

My problem is that I am connected 24/7 with a person that is compromising my interests and my intellectual property at a time when I am litigating civil and criminal proceedings. My business interests are also greatly compromised. I do not know how I became telepathic, or if I was trained without my knowledge and or consent. I need to seek help in trying to disconnect. The person that is connected to me subjects me to a brutal array of mental and psychological abuse.

I firmly believe that they are being used as a medium for this purpose. I have waited 20 years to resolve my issues in a Court of Law, and this is not a good time for this ability to assert itself, and of course it is very suspect considering my Federal False Claims Act allegations.

Unfortunately, I have had personal “dealings” with the Department of Advanced Research Projects (DARPA) that dates back to 1990 when I had contracts with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and DARPA. I know that they study and research paranormal activities and technologies, including remote channeling. My Whistle-Blowing activities and my knowledge of the fraud within ISC back in 1987, has put me in direct scrutiny of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) due to their relationships with ISC, and of course my very public condemnation of the fraud.

In the past few weeks I have downloaded a declassified document dump from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that contained hundreds of bibliographies from the Soviet Union dating as far back as the 1930’s regarding this subject. It appears that they have more knowledge and expertise than the United States. This brings me to a disclosure that may or may not be concerning. Over the past several months I have had two contacts and intimate conversation with an 80-year-old Russian immigrant regarding my problem. She seemed to be knowledgeable of the subject matter and made several disclosures, which may or not be true.

She said that she was a Psychologist with a Doctorate degree and a former employee of the Pennsylvania State University System. She also disclosed that her former husband was imprisoned and tortured by the KGB.

I will copy Senator Diane Feinstein of California with this letter. The fact that she serves on the Judiciary Committee with you and the fact that she is also on the Senate Select Intelligence Committee might help me find a solution to this problem. I would hope that you both might be able to help me find someone that can help me disconnect from this other telepathic person, while at the same time taking any making certain there are no National Security issues.

In another matter, I also will enclose a copy of an email from the Government Accounting Office (GAO) pertaining a document that I am trying to locate that was sent to me in 1987 from the GAO. I would appreciate it if you could follow-up on this and make sure I am afforded the FOIA for this document.

I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,
Stan J. Caterbone

cc: USPS Certified Mail

Enclosures: Letter of June 15, 2007
May 24, 2007 – Letter from United States Postal Inspection Service
February 26, 2007 - Email to DARPA
April 12, 2007 – Email Confirmation from CIA
2002 – CIA Declassified Document
July 10, 2007 – Email from The GAO


EXHIBIT

July 16, 2007

Stan Caterbone, Pro Se Litigant
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603

Federal Bureau of Investigations
J. Edger Hoover Building
935 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20535-0001

Re: Important Matters

Dear Sir or Madam:

First of all, I received a personal letter from Senator Arlen Specter on July 11, 2007. It was held in the mail system or was stolen for almost a full 30 days. I have had so many complaints regarding the same that I filed a complaint with the United States Postal Inspector (See Attached). They had written me but I never did receive the follow-up to the investigation as the letter promise. I am attaching a copy of the letter with the hopes that you could followup and make certain that my complaint is not being subverted.

If you are not aware, I have a Federal Whistle-Blowing and Federal False Claims Act case that I need to file against the United States Attorney General, as required by law. This case involves the former Department of Defense contractor International Signal & Control, Plc, (ISC) formerly of Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, I also have an unprecedented case of obstruction of justice that surrounds that case, and I am evaluating the merits of waiting until your subcommittee finds a resolution to U.S. Attorney General controversy before I file my action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. I am certain that any filing before would only be subject to further misconduct. My cases now before the United States District Courts and the various Courts of the Commonwealth have been subject to an unprecedented array of judicial misconduct. However, I realize that you do not have the authority or the jurisdiction to intervene, so I am told.

For approximately the past 19 months I have had the ability to communicate telepathically. I have spent much time researching this ability through the various intelligence agencies declassified documents. My problem is that I am connected 24/7 with a person (Sheryl Crow) that is compromising my interests and my intellectual property at a time when I am litigating civil and criminal proceedings. My business interests are also greatly compromised.

I do not know how I became telepathic, or if I was trained without my knowledge and or consent. I need to seek help in trying to disconnect. The person that is connected to me subjects me to a brutal array of mental and psychological abuse. I firmly believe that they are being used as a medium for this purpose. I have waited 20 years to resolve my issues in a Court of Law, and this is not a good time for this ability to assert itself, and of course it is very suspect considering my Federal False Claims Act allegations.

Unfortunately, I have had personal “dealings” with the Department of Advanced Research Projects (DARPA) that dates back to 1990 when I had contracts with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and DARPA. I know that they study and research paranormal activities and technologies, including remote channeling. My Whistle-Blowing activities and my knowledge of the fraud within ISC back in 1987, has put me in direct scrutiny of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) due to their relationships with ISC, and of course my very public condemnation of the fraud. I don’t know if any of your agents have any experience with this type of situation, but there are definitely National Security issues that may need to be addressed. There are persons that can actually eaves drop on this type of communication, and I am constantly being question on matters related to ISC, and other foreign affairs. My knowledge of the Middle East is quite extensive, and there is always the possibility for someone to glean information for illegitimate reasons.

In the past few weeks I have downloaded a declassified document dump from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that contained hundreds of bibliographies from the Soviet Union dating as far back as the 1930’s regarding this subject. It appears that they have more knowledge and expertise than the United States. This brings me to a disclosure that may or may not be concerning. Over the past several months I have had two contacts and intimate conversation with an 80-year-old Russian immigrant regarding my problem. She seemed to be knowledgeable of the subject matter and made several disclosures, which may or not be true.


She said that she was a Psychologist with a Doctorate degree and a former employee of the Pennsylvania State University System. She also disclosed that her former husband was imprisoned and tortured by the KGB.

I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

Stan J. Caterbone

cc: USPS Certified Mail

Enclosures: Letter of June 15, 2007
May 24, 2007 – Letter from United States Postal Inspection Service
February 26, 2007 - Email to DARPA
April 12, 2007 – Email Confirmation from CIA
2002 – CIA Declassified Document
July 10, 2007 – Email from The GAO

EXHIBIT

December 3, 2007
Stanley J. Caterbone
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603

R. Scott Smith
Chairman, President
And Chief Executive Officer
Fulton Financial Corporation
One Penn Square
P.O. Box 4887
Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17604


Re: Black Budget Identities of the United States Government regarding Covert Activates & Mind Control
Rufus Fulton, Former Chairman and Chief Executive Officer & Department of Defense
Caterbone v. Fulton Bank litigation
Federal False Claims Act Complaint re International Signal & Control (ISC) of Lancaster, PA


Dear Mr. Smith:

I would like to bring to your attention a very dire matter that severely implicates Fulton Bank and Fulton Financial Corporation. I would like to bring to your attention the Rufus Fulton interview of November 21, 2007 broadcast on WGAL TV 8 News at 6. This interview disclosed National Security information for the first time regarding his work for the Department of Defense and the Kennedy Administration.

I am suggesting that his classified work with the Department of Defense and his present influence concerning National Security matters is a dire conflict of interest concerning my litigation against Fulton Bank that needs to be investigated by outside agencies and or authorities.

I have serious questions regarding the Defense Intelligence Agency and the possible collusion with your institution. You have to understand that in July of 2005 while I was visiting a museum on a military base in Austin Texas, I was detained by 2 agents for the Defense Intelligence Agency and questioned about my Federal case 02-5588 Caterbone v. Lancaster County Prison, et al., which Fulton Bank is a defendant, and my whereabouts as well as my destination.

They required me to verify where I was staying, and called my brother Phil's Doctors office in Austin, whom I was staying with, and caused his staff problems by getting them alarmed about the situation. They were not very nice and I left them with the question "We are all on the same team, aren't we?

They left me be on my way after reviewing my documents and my Federal civil complaint, which included information about ISC and my allegations and Federal False Claims Act; and demanding that I do not visit any more military bases. To my knowledge I have had no physical contact since.

The problem is the involvement of the Department of Defense, Mr. Rufus Fulton’s past affiliation and possible influence, my allegations and civil complaints against Fulton Bank, and my telepathic abilities and remote viewing .

For some time I have been trying to identify groups and or agencies that may have remotely trained me. I have written to and personally visited the office of Senator Arlen Specter , the Federal Bureau of Investigation , the Senate Select Committee for Intelligence , and corresponded with the Defense Advanced for Research Projects Agency , and the Central Intelligence Agency with the hopes of finding some answers. However they have proved fruitless.

See the attached research document dated Thursday, November 29, 2007, titled “THE SHADOW GOVERNMENT: ITS IDENTIFICATION AND ANALYSIS”, by Richard J. Boylan, Ph.D ; it is a report that identifies organizations, agencies, and companies that are directly involved with mental telepathy and remote viewing, most of which operate under the direction and funding of the Department of Defense. I have just recently discovered this document on Friday, November 30, 2007 and found it most disturbing after having to watch the Rufus Fulton interview the prior week. Pay particular attention to the items in red highlight.

Your Board of Directors and the Securities and Exchange Commission should be and will be alerted to this discovery. I wish you would reconsider your letter of November 14, 2007 and your position no to meet with me personally to discuss some of these issues. I believe it will be in your best interest to stay ahead of this information. A civil and criminal conspiracy allegation that involves this information will have dire consequences to your major stakeholders and your shareholders.

As a courtesy I will promise to give you until the end of this week, December 7, 2007 to review this material and perform any due diligence that you seem worthy; and communicate a response. After that time, I will take it upon myself to disclose this information as it pertains to Fulton Bank and Fulton Financial Corporation to the Securities and Exchange Commission, and others that will help protect my interests and the interests of the Advanced Media Group and my litigation v. Fulton Bank.


Respectfully,


Advanced Media Group
Stan J. Caterbone
www.amgglobalentertainmentgroup.com
Visit Our Blog
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Copy to file
Deliver to Stephanie Carfley, Barley Snyder, LLC

EXHIBIT

December 20, 2007

Stanley J. Caterbone
Advanced Media Group
1250 Fremont Street
Lancaster, PA 17603

Supervisor
Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBI Harrisburg Field Office
Harrisburg, PA 17108

Re: Visit on December 14, 2007

Dear Sir or Madam:

Last Friday, December 14, 2007, I visited your office to review and make additional complaints regarding my recent visits to your office. Unfortunately, I could not remember the dates of our meetings. I could only leave with you a DVD containing my complaint and evidence thereof.
Fortunately for your office, and me I have reviewed my records concerning my visits, calls, and online complaints to your office, and the FBI at-large. You will find the records attached. There may be more documented contacts and complaints.
For your review, I also attached information regarding the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Please proceed accordingly.

Respectfully,



Stan J. Caterbone, Pro Se
Advanced Media Group

Attachment

cc: file
U.S. Senator Arlen Specter









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